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A Deep Free Trade Agreement (FTA+) between Ukraine and the EU is part of the Association Agreement that 
the two sides are currently negotiating. The “deep” here refers to the fact that both the EU and Ukraine want 
to underpin free trade in the classical sense by bringing Ukraine’s regulatory base in line with the EU acquis in 
trade-related areas such as state aid, intellectual property rights, public procurement and so on. How likely is 
it that a Deep Free Trade Agreement will be signed and can we expect Ukraine to press ahead with its regula-
tory convergence? If the negotiations produce real results, how will they aff ect Ukraine and the EU? And, fi nally, 
how might the Association Agreement with FTA+ pave the way for a deeper relationship between Ukraine and 
the EU?
Negotiations on the FTA+ are still ongoing. Although information about the course of these talks and their cur-
rent state is scarce, it is clear that the FTA+ is very much alive and ticking and has the potential to increase the 
EU’s transformative power in Ukraine.
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The ABCs of FTA+
The Deep Free Trade Agreement is part of an As-
sociation Agreement that will replace the current 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) be-
tween Ukraine and the EU. The other three parts of 
the Association Agreement cover a) political dialog 
and foreign and security policy, b) justice, freedom 
and security, and c) economic and sectoral coopera-
tion. While Ukraine and the EU began negotiations 
on these three aspects back in March 2007, talks on 
the FTA+ were only launched after Ukraine’s WTO 
membership was ratified in February 2008.
The FTA+ between Ukraine and the EU is different 
from classic free trade agreements, as the two sides 
will not merely discuss changes in tariffs and quo-
tas to improve conditions for mutual market access. 
The major goal of the FTA+ is to achieve regulatory 
convergence, that is, the harmonization of Ukraini-
an legislation with the EU acquis communautaire.
In the first documents on the European Neighbor-
hood Policy (ENP), the EU still offered Ukraine and 
all other ENP countries “a full stake in the internal 
market.” In return, ENP partners were expected to 
follow the example of the members of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) and to take on large parts of 
the acquis that are relevant for the regulation of the 
EU’s Internal Market. In 2006, the EU began to back 
away from this “carrot.” Instead, EU documents 
stressed a longer-term vision of an economic com-
munity emerging between the EU and ENP partners 
and anticipated that ENP countries would selective-
ly adopt relevant parts of the EU acquis.
Dances with the Acquis
On one hand, this process can be interpreted as 
backtracking. Selective harmonization rather than 
full adoption of the acquis could also offer those 
Ukrainian businesses that are closely linked to 
domestic politics opportunities for “cherry-pick-
ing,” that is, electing to converge regulations only 
in those areas of the acquis that serve their private 
business interests. Although negotiators report that 
FTA+ talks are still happening at a strictly techni-
cal level, the process is likely to become more po-
European Focus, November 2009
Shaping a European Vision for Ukraine
liticized as soon as Ukraine’s business community 
begins to show interest in the process prior to the 
ratification of the agreement by the Ukrainian legis-
lature. Whether this will result in additional amend-
ments or revisions in the text remains to be seen.
On the other hand, selective harmonization can 
also be looked on as a more pragmatic approach, 
since Ukraine is not a candidate country. Given that 
Ukraine has weaker administrative capacities and 
incentives than EU candidates, it makes little sense, 
for instance, for the country to fully take on the cost-
ly EU acquis on the environment. First of all, this is 
not a prerequisite for signing an FTA+. Secondly, 
Ukraine would not have access to EU structural 
funds to ease the cost of harmonization with the en-
vironmental acquis. Yet these incentives played an 
important role in inducing, legitimizing and stabi-
lizing change in one-time EU candidate countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe.
Even with selective harmonization, however, the 
range of areas that need to be negotiated in the As-
sociation Agreement is very broad (see Table 1). 
Nevertheless, some duplication between economic 
and sectoral cooperation and the FTA+ exist, since 
negotiations on the FTA+ began nearly a year lat-
er. In terms of cooperation, both sides have agreed 
to include several annexes covering most areas. 
These annexes refer to particular EC Directives that 
Ukraine’s lawmakers need to take on and to spe-
cific transition periods during which the harmoni-
zation needs to take place. Similar annexes are also 
planned in the FTA+, but it is still subject to discus-
sion between the two sides as to how to link the two 
documents.
Table 1: Areas of negotiation for EU-Ukraine Association Agreement
Economic and Sectoral Cooperation FTA+
Company law
Sports
Tourism
Management of public finances
Health policy
Energy, including nuclear energy
Environmental cooperation
Industrial and commercial policy
Cross-border and regional cooperation
Education
Training and youth
Culture
Research and technological development
Macro-economic cooperation
Social cooperation
Mining and metals
Agriculture and rural development
Transport and audio-visual policy
Taxation
Statistics
Consumer protection
Information society and space
Civil society
Financial markets
Fisheries and maritime issues
Trade in goods (Trade Defense Instrument and tariffs/tariff 
barriers to trade)
Trade and sustainable development
Rules of origin
Services
Intellectual property rights (incl. geographical indications)
Trade facilitation and customs
Public procurement
Competition (anti-trust and state aid)
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards
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Signing the dotted line
Despite President Viktor Yushchenko’s hope that at 
least the political part of the Association Agreement 
might be signed at the EU-Ukraine Summit on 4 De-
cember 2009, the EU has made clear that it will sign 
the Agreement only when all aspects are agreed. 
Unlike Ukraine’s President, who is interested in 
concluding the Agreement prior to the Presidential 
election scheduled for January 2010, neither the EU 
nor Ukraine’s negotiators want to rush, preferring 
to conclude a detailed and comprehensive agree-
ment.1 More recently, even President Yushchenko 
has begun to approach the conclusion of the Asso-
ciation Agreement more realistically.2
According to the 2nd joint EU-Ukraine Progress Re-
port, all chapters of the political part of the Agree-
ment were provisionally closed in June 2008, while 
the chapters on illegal employment, the movement 
of people, and admission rules still need to be dis-
cussed in the part on justice, freedom and security. 
The parts on economic and sectoral cooperation, 
and particularly on the FTA+, are complex and here 
negotiations still need time. In the cooperation part, 
19 out of 26 chapters could be provisionally closed. 
Talks on the FTA+ are still in their initial phase.
During the recent 8th round of negotiations in early 
October 2009, the chapter on customs reform and 
intellectual property rights in the FTA+ was ready 
to be provisionally closed. The chapter on anti-trust 
is progressing, while issues like public procure-
ment, sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) 
and tariffs and quotas will still be subject to intense 
debate. The next round of negotiations is scheduled 
for December 2009, with two more rounds planned 
for March and May 2010.
The end of negotiations between Ukraine and the 
EU is still open since neither the European nor the 
1 “Is there no chance of negotiating a Free Trade Zone 
prior to the Ukraine-EU Summit?” (in Russian), UNI-
AN, 10 October 2009.
2 “Viktor Yushchenko retreats to necessary positions” 
(in Russian), Kommersant, 16 October 2009.
 “Next round of EU-Ukraine negotiations on FTA to 
be held on 7–11 December 2009,” Press Release, Del-
egation of the European Commission to Ukraine, 12 
October 2009. 
Ukrainian negotiators commit to a specific date. In 
any case, some provisions of the Agreement, mainly 
those related to the FTA+ and to the institutional 
framework, are likely to enter into force provisionally 
once the EU institutions and Ukraine have notified 
each other of the completion of the adoption proce-
dures. In the case of the EU-Chile Association Agree-
ment, provisional adoption took place within a couple 
of months. In Ukraine, this process could be delayed, 
if the unstable situation in the Verkhovna Rada does 
not end. After that, the enactment of the Association 
Agreement is likely to take two or three years after 
the official conclusion of negotiations, based on the 
EU-Chile Agreement experience. This is because the 
legislatures of 27 EU member countries have to ratify 
the Agreement before it can enter into force.
What’s in the FTA+ for the EU?
The EU has certainly an interest in bringing Ukraine 
closer, as it wants to create a stable “ring of friends” 
in its neighborhood.4 As to enlargement, some mem-
bers, such as Germany, France, Spain, the Nether-
lands, and Belgium, argue that the EU “lacks ab-
sorption capacities” to offer the strongest carrot to 
Ukraine, that is, prospects of EU membership and a 
full stake in the EU Internal Market. Instead, the EU 
is offering a smaller carrot: an Association Agree-
ment including FTA+, at the cost of slower reforms 
in Ukraine than in EU candidates.
It is obvious that the EU negotiators of the Associa-
tion Agreement, especially of the FTA+, do not see 
Ukraine as a potential member. The EU does not 
expect Ukraine to commit itself to adopt the full ac-
quis. For instance, it is Ukraine’s choice to harmo-
nize its national legislation with the EC Directives 
on Waste Management, as this step is not necessary 
to finalize the FTA+. In contrast, the EU negotia-
tors of the FTA+ certainly have an interest in im-
proving conditions for their businesses in Ukraine. 
Here, they expect the Ukrainian side to demonstrate 
strong commitment to legal harmonization prior to 
4 Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe: A proximity policy 
as the key to stability,” speech delivered at the Sixth 
ECSA World Conference, Brussels, 5 and 6 December 
2002.
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the conclusion of the Agreement in areas like intel-
lectual property rights, state aid and public procure-
ment, as well as non-tariff barriers to trade such as 
technical standards.
In terms of tariffs and quotas, the EU negotiators will 
most likely not offer comprehensive concessions for 
Ukraine’s agricultural imports. Even though this is 
one of the most important issues for the Ukrainian 
side, the EU will continue to protect its own farm-
ers. Recent protests in front of the European Com-
mission in Brussels by EU dairy farmers against the 
gradual elimination of protectionist measures have 
shown how politically charged this topic is in Eu-
rope.
EU concessions regarding tariffs and quotas are 
certainly not being traded against Ukrainian con-
cessions in regulatory convergence in a “tit for tat” 
style. According to one EU official, European busi-
ness is not pushing the European Commission to 
conclude the FTA+ with Ukraine as soon as pos-
sible, as was the case during FTA negotiations with 
South Korea. While EU business generally supports 
an FTA+ with Ukraine, the country’s political in-
stability and poor rankings on business climate or 
regulatory environment do not offer the most attrac-
tive destination for investments.
Support on the home front
Ukraine’s Ministries
For public consumption, official Ukraine supports 
domestic reforms to bring the country’s legislation 
in line with EU requirements, since Ukrainian law 
calls for a legal approximation to the EU acquis.5 
However, real efforts to promote harmonization have 
been weak in recent years. Despite the assistance of 
foreign and Ukrainian experts from USAID, the EU 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
in drafting new legislation according to European 
and/or international requirements, the outcome 
has been frustrating in many cases due to internal 
5 In 2004, the “National Program for the Approxima-
tion of Ukraine’s Legislation to that of the European 
Union” passed into law, requiring the conformity of 
Ukrainian bills with the EU acquis.
resistance. Bills submitted to the Verkhovna Rada 
tended to comply only partly or not at all with the 
acquis. The Laws on standardization, on assurance 
of conformity assessment (2001) and on food safety 
and quality (2005) serve as just a few examples.
Resistance from Derzhspozhyvstandart, Ukraine’s 
consumer standards body, meant that the two bills 
on technical regulation submitted over to the Rada 
in 2001, as well as subsequent amendments pre-
pared for the Rada in 2007, continued to treat stan-
dards as mandatory. The EU, by contrast, defines 
standards as voluntary. Furthermore, the bills and 
their amendments did not call for the restructuring 
of Derzhspozhyvstandart. To date, this body handles 
standardization, certification and conformity assess-
ment, although EC law calls for these tasks to be dis-
tributed across several agencies in order to prevent 
conflicts of interests.
As far as Ukraine’s Law on food safety and quality 
is concerned, USAID experts advised the Ministries 
of Health and Agriculture to call for the mandato-
ry use of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) principles that define the EU’s ap-
proach to food safety control. This would have been 
a decisive step towards improving the chances of 
Ukrainian farm exports being given access to the 
EU Internal Market. Again, resistance from the line 
ministries obstructed this. As a result, this Law calls 
for voluntary application of HACCP and does not 
obligate state inspectors and producers to bring lo-
cal food safety standards more in line with EU and 
international requirements, according to a recent 
IFC report.
The Verkhovna Rada
Generally speaking, there is consensus among 
Ukraine’s leading political forces that EU integra-
tion is a strategic choice for the country. Yet very 
few politicians are ready to give up their local inter-
ests for the sake of better rules of the game for all, 
based on European standards.
The pro-presidential Nasha Ukraina–Narodna 
Samooborona (NUNS) bloc is probably the most 
consistent force, when it comes to supporting 
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Ukraine’s EU integration, even though the bloc is 
increasingly divided into a faction of reliable Yush-
chenko supporters and a pro-Tymoshenko faction. 
The position of the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT) 
in the Verkhovna Rada is not always consistent with 
the government policy of Premier Tymoshenko, 
their leader. Although the Tymoshenko Govern-
ment is running negotiations on the EU-Ukraine 
FTA+ and generally supports EU integration, in 
March 2009, the BYT faction in the Rada supported 
the adoption of a law that introduced a temporary 
1% import duty for a range of products, including 
meat, textiles, some motor vehicles and home appli-
ances. Later, the Cabinet of Ministers abolished the 
surcharge for these products, except for refrigera-
tors and motor vehicles. On 6 September 2009, the 
remaining surcharge expired. The law clearly devi-
ated from Ukraine’s commitments in WTO and put 
the Government in a difficult situation with the EU.
The Party of the Regions (PR) is divided in its sup-
port of the FTA+ due to sometimes conflicting in-
terests internally. On one hand, PR represents the 
interests of big industrial holdings like System Capi-
tal Management, which is owned by party member 
Rinat Akhmetov. These kinds of business groups are 
certainly interested in capitalizing their assets on in-
ternational markets and support the improved con-
ditions for Ukrainian exports and foreign investment 
in Ukraine that would follow approximation to the 
acquis. On the other hand, PR represents the inter-
ests of the “red directors” from Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine. Their industries, such as machine-building, 
will suffer from higher competition and reduced 
state subsidies if Ukraine switches to EU practice.
In 2007, the Verkhovna Rada demonstrated its gen-
erally strong support for Ukraine’s EU choice when 
99 out of 450 deputies across all factions voted in 
favor of a Resolution “On the start of negotiations 
between Ukraine and the EU on a new basic agree-
ment.” The Rada expressed its preference to con-
clude a legally-binding agreement that would lead 
to Ukrainian participation in the Single Market in 
the medium term and EU membership in the long 
run. The Rada also committed itself to harmonizing 
legislation to the EU acquis.
On the ground, however, the situation is different. 
Despite all the proclaimed support, the Verkhovna 
Rada is an equally strong obstacle to the harmoniza-
tion with EU laws as are major elements in the ex-
ecutive branch:
In 2004, the Verkhovna Rada rejected the Bill 
“On State Aid,” which would have introduced 
EU standards.
In 2007, amendments to the Law “On the Pro-
tection of Economic Competition,” which also 
sought compliance with the EU acquis on state 
aid, also failed in the Rada.
In 2008, the Verkhovna Rada rejected amend-
ments intended to make the Laws on standard-
ization and conformity assessment more compli-
ant with EU legislation.
For almost a decade, the Verkhovna Rada hin-
dered the adoption of a Joint Stock Company 
Law that would increase the transparency of 
companies and strengthen the rights of minority 
shareholders in line with international practice 
and EC Directives.6 Ukraine was the last country 
in the CIS to adopt such a law, when the Rada 
finally overcame long-lasting resistance in Sep-
tember 2008.
Still, opposition to bills intended to increase the 
level of compliance with the EU acquis is not nec-
essarily a sign of anti-EU attitudes. Rather, close 
ties between business and politics often prevent 
the adoption of specific legislation, as the case with 
state aid reforms suggests. Other laws, such as the 
ones on technical regulation, fail to be adopted due 
to political in-fighting among different camps that 
are unable to form a stable coalition.
6 For a long time, EU Corporate Governance issues most 
often depended on voluntary codes or national laws 
and regulations. Only parts of corporate governance 
issues fell within the scope of Community law, such as 
company law and financial services. Due to a number 
of EU corporate scandals in 200, the European Com-
mission recognized the need to regulate this issue at 
the Union level. In 2007, the EC Directive on share-
holder rights (Directive 2007/6/EC) was adopted by 
the European Parliament and the Council.
•
•
•
•
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Desperately seeking conditionality
Against the background of strong domestic resis-
tance towards concrete support of Ukraine’s legal 
approximation to the EU acquis, it is not surprising 
that the nucleus of Ukraine’s pro-EU forces, namely, 
parts of the Ministry of Economy and the State De-
partment of Legal Approximation (SDLA) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is hoping to increase 
conditionality in the Association Agreement.
Experience with the PCA and the ENP Action Plan 
has shown that loosely-defined goals and time-
frames have allowed Ukraine’s officials to offer lip 
service and do little. A binding, clear and credible 
agreement will put pressure on Ukraine’s Govern-
ment and legislature. To this end, Ukraine’s approx-
imation commitments will be included in annexes to 
the Agreement as lists of EC Directives to be fully 
or partly harmonized within a specific period of 
time. Since the EU acquis is also subject to change, 
Ukraine’s desire to include references to EC Direc-
tives in the Agreement will create some legal prob-
lems for the EU side. Still, its negotiators support the 
Ukrainians’ request for stronger conditionality, as 
they understand quite well that the EU is needed as 
an external anchor for domestic reforms.7
Following the usual practice of Association Agree-
ments between the EU and its partners, the new 
agreement with Ukraine differs from the older PCA 
in terms of institutional innovations. The Associa-
tion Agreement introduces the possibility of bind-
ing decisions by a Joint Council. While the areas in 
which the Joint Council could take such decisions 
will be defined towards the end of the negotiations, 
it is likely that the approach will resemble the WTO 
dispute settlement process.
Mutually beneficial liberalization
How will the two sides benefit from further liberal-
ization of EU-Ukraine trade relations and reforms to 
Ukraine’s economic governance through regulatory 
convergence with the EU acquis?
7 Interview with EU official, October 2009.
Tariffs and quotas
EU-Ukraine trade relations are already quite liberal-
ized. After its accession to WTO in 2008, Ukraine re-
duced its tariff rates for many agricultural and food 
products (meat and dairy products, processed foods, 
spirits and alcoholic beverages, and so on) and some 
finished industrial products (some pharmaceuticals, 
cars, farm machinery, IT products, medical equip-
ment, and so on). European firms benefited from 
this, since the EU mainly exports machinery, trans-
port equipment, chemicals, textiles and clothing, 
and agricultural products to Ukraine.
For its part, the EU has been liberalizing its markets 
to Ukrainian commodities since the early 1990s. 
In 199, Ukraine became a beneficiary of the EU’s 
General System of Preferences (GSP). As a conse-
quence, the import of some key Ukrainian export 
commodities, like chemicals and vegetable oils, has 
been liberalized. But many other products that con-
stitute Ukraine’s core export commodities, such as 
iron and steel, grain, seeds, fruits, and plants, fish 
products, have not been granted GSP benefits. Trade 
in iron and steel was only liberalized after Ukraine 
joined WTO. The EU eliminated its export quotas 
on rolled metal, which was the main export-boost-
ing factor in Ukraine’s WTO accession.8
However, exports of farm products to the EU are still 
strongly restricted through high tariffs and quotas. 
Thus, the liberalization of agricultural trade is one 
of the most critical issues in the FTA+ negotiations. 
Given that reliable information on offers regarding 
quotas and tariffs is currently not accessible, respec-
tive numbers, which were recently published by 
Kommersant, have to be treated carefully. If correct, 
the EU offer would be well below Ukraine’s expecta-
tions: a quota of 70,000 tonnes for corn imports out 
of an annual harvest of 7mn t and a quota of 40,000 t 
on refined sugar of a total of some 1.5mn t that are 
likely to be refined in 2009.9
8 Veronika Movchan, “Ukraine and the WTO: One year 
on,” World Finance Review, September 2009.
9 “Negative Associations: Right now, the EU is not pre-
pared to accept Ukraine ‘as is’” (in Russian), Kommer-
sant, 168, 5 October 2009.
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The situation in other areas of the farm sector, such 
as meat and dairy, is not easy, either. The EU market 
will remain completely closed for Ukrainian products 
in these two sub-sectors, as long as they do not meet 
EU food quality and safety standards. Following a re-
quest by Ukraine’s State Department of Veterinary 
Medicine, the European Commission’s Food and Ve-
terinary Office (FVO) inspected Ukrainian dairy and 
meat plants in 2008 and 2009 and confirmed the lack 
of compliance. Once Ukrainian dairy and meat pro-
ducers meet EU standards, they will be able to export. 
Even though the EU will certainly introduce quotas to 
restrict the amount of Ukrainian exports, the Russian 
case shows that harmonization with the EU SPS re-
quirements can prompt the opening of the highly-pro-
tected EU dairy market. Several Russian dairy plants 
now comply with EU food safety and quality standards 
and have received permission to export to the EU.
Costs and benefits of regulatory convergence
The FTA+ offers a chance to improve Ukraine’s 
agricultural export potential by adopting EU SPS 
requirements within the new Agreement. The more 
strongly the Ukrainian side commits itself to regula-
tory convergence in this area—and the more serious 
the implementation—, the more difficult it will be 
for the EU to continue protecting its markets in the 
future. This means that Ukraine should negotiate a 
schedule for the gradual opening of the EU market 
as the country raises its standards to EU levels.
Despite positive effects on the competitiveness of 
Ukrainian food products, the adoption of EU food 
safety and quality standards will require Ukraine to 
restructure its agricultural market and this will have 
attached social costs. Similar developments in EU can-
didate countries like Poland suggest that major food 
producers find it relatively easy to meet EU require-
ments due to economies of scale. Small producers will, 
instead, be crowded out of the market.10 For instance, 
Ukraine’s harmonization with EU SPS requirements is 
likely to have a strong impact on the domestic dairy 
sector: rural households rather than commercial farms 
produce the lion’s share, 80%, of Ukraine’s raw milk. 
10 Elizabeth Dunn, “Trojan Pig: Paradoxes of food safety 
regulation,” Environment and Planning, 5 (8), 200, 
pp. 149–1511.
These families, especially elderly pensioners, strong-
ly depend on the production of milk as an additional 
source of income. Yet they will find it difficult to meet 
EU requirements as they have no economies of scale. 
This means that transition periods and structural sup-
port programs for the most affected sectors are needed 
to mitigate the negative impact and support commer-
cial transformation.
The commitment on regulatory convergence in oth-
er areas, such as state aid and public procurement, 
will also produce high short-term costs for Ukraine:
Convergence with EU state aid rules will affect 
Ukrainian industries like machinery, coal mining 
and agriculture, all of which receive state subsi-
dies or tax breaks. The adoption of EU practices 
requires a change in the relationship between 
public and private players. This will be difficult, as 
the owners of large enterprises have considerable 
political power in Ukraine. At the same time, the 
current state aid regime supports too many dys-
functional companies and does not stimulate them 
to increase efficiency. Of course, the EU does not 
exclude the possibility of state aid to specific com-
panies and sectors or regions with high unemploy-
ment, provided that the selection process is trans-
parent and fair and does not distort competition. 
Most EU state aid is, however, channeled for en-
vironmental purposes and energy conservation, 
R&D, and SME development. Getting in line with 
the structure of EU state aid would help Ukraine 
decrease its energy consumption and spur eco-
nomic development through scientific innovation.
The existing public procurement system in 
Ukraine is corrupt, opaque and inefficient. To be 
sure, adjustment in this area will make it more dif-
ficult for Ukrainian firms to win public contracts 
since more transparency will also simplify access 
for foreign firms. To what extent Ukrainian firms 
will benefit from easier access to EU tenders de-
pends on their competitiveness. Still, more com-
petition on Ukraine’s public procurement market 
should reduce corruption. Moreover, it should en-
able the Ukrainian government to offer better pub-
lic services to its citizens at lower cost.
•
•
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In short, reforms in areas like state aid and public 
procurement will be good for Ukraine and its econo-
my, as they will improve the investment climate, re-
duce opportunities for corruption, and improve the 
quality of public services. According to some esti-
mates, improved institutions and better governance 
could add 20-0% to GDP in the long term.11
Conclusion:  
More commitment all around
Negotiations on a Deep Free Trade Agreement be-
tween Ukraine and the EU are showing considerable 
progress in areas like customs reforms, intellectual 
property rights and anti-trust legislation. Still, the 
FTA’s comprehensiveness and its real impact on 
Ukraine and the EU remain to be seen. The fact that 
the Ukrainian negotiators are asking for stronger 
conditionality is a good sign. For its part, the EU is 
demonstrating commitment to serve as an external 
anchor for domestic reform. In contrast to the EU-
Ukraine PCA and other bilateral documents, the 
negotiators appear determined to establish clearer 
guidelines and timeframes for domestic reform and 
Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU. The Associa-
tion Agreement including the FTA+ has thus the 
potential of bringing Ukraine closer to the EU.
To exploit this potential, both Ukraine and the EU 
will have to make stronger commitments, since 
Ukraine’s regulatory convergence with EU rules 
will not only have positive effects for Ukraine’s in-
vestment climate and overall economic situation. It 
will also impose high short-term adaptation costs on 
certain interest groups within the country.
Given this, the EU will have to offer some incen-
tives for domestic reform that could have positive 
effects for Ukrainian producers in the short-term. 
On one hand, a further reduction in tariffs against 
Ukraine’s current core export commodities, mainly 
agriculture, is needed as well as an increase in re-
spective import quotas to the EU. On the other, the 
EU should signal its willingness to decrease protec-
tionist measures regarding the imports of Ukraine’s 
food products as soon as those meet EU food qual-
ity and safety standards. Last but not least, the Eu-
ropean Commission should provide more targeted 
assistance to domestic public and private actors and 
scrutinize the implementation of Ukraine’s commit-
ments.
Ukraine must raise commitment at home to conver-
gence with EU norms and reform of economic gov-
ernance beyond the negotiating team. At the same 
time, there is a strong need for real public debate 
to prevent opposition to the FTA+ from Ukraine’s 
lawmakers, bureaucrats and businesses.
Given the upcoming Presidential election, Ukrai-
nian politicians are understandably reluctant to dis-
cuss the costs and benefits of the FTA+. This topic 
will not show up in the platforms of the majority of 
candidates, as it is not likely to bring more votes. But 
if local politicians want to regain the trust of Ukrai-
nian voters that they lost in the aftermath of the Or-
ange Revolution, they should look beyond January 
2010 and start building more Europe in Ukraine.
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